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xiThe Impact of the Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
During his visit to Asia in November 2017, U.S. President Donald 
Trump unveiled his vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as the 
U.S. approach to Asia. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo elaborated 
on the administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy at the Indo-Pacific Busi-
ness Forum of the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce in Washington, 
D.C., on July 30, 2018. He an-
nounced that $113 million will 
be allocated as a “down pay-
ment” to fund new initiatives 
to bolster the digital economy, 
energy, and infrastructure of the 
region. Pompeo also pledged to 
strengthen American support for 
key regional institutions such as 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), Lower Mekong Initiative, and 
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to advance the Indo-Pacific 
strategy (Pompeo 2018). Moreover, speaking at the APEC CEO 
Summit in November 2018 in Papua New Guinea, Vice President 
Mike Pence discussed the strategy’s economic components. Regard-
ing trade, Pence echoed Trump’s 2017 APEC speech that Washington 
will “make bilateral trade agreements with any Indo-Pacific nation 
that wants to be our partner and that will abide by the principles of 
fair and reciprocal trade.” The United States also seeks to promote 
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private sector investment. Moreover, Pence stressed that the Trump 
administration aims to assist regional states on sustainable infrastruc-
ture development (Pence 2018).
1The Impact of the Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
The Impact of the 
Trump Administration’s 
Indo-Pacific Strategy 
on Regional Economic 
Governance
Overview
This paper examines the economic aspects of the Trump administra-
tion’s Indo-Pacific strategy. “Strategy” is defined as “the collection of 
plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness 
political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to ad-
vance that state’s national interest” 
(Feaver 2009). In other words, this 
paper scrutinizes the economic 
components of the U.S. Indo-
Pacific strategy and its impact on 
the future development of Asian 
economic governance. The paper 
focuses on the following ques-
tions: What are the economic 
The Trump administration’s 
Indo-Pacific strategy is limited 
to trade, investment, and 
infrastructure development
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components of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy? How has this policy 
been received by regional states? How will Indo-Pacific and Asia Pacific 
policies interact to shape the future development of Asian economic 
architectures? What should American and regional policymakers do to 
prevent or lessen conflicts among their different policies and strategies 
and further foster economic regionalism? 
The Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy is limited to 
trade, investment, and infrastructure development, and the level of 
reception by regional states varies by issue area, with infrastructure 
and investment being positively received, and trade being negatively 
received. While there is no obvious conflict between Indo-Pacific 
and Asia Pacific investment and infrastructure development policies, 
both the United States and Asian nations have practiced mutual ne-
glect, which will result in more fragmented governance architectures. 
A “governance architecture” refers to the overarching structure of 
public and private institutions comprising organizations, principles, 
norms, regulations, and decision-making procedures in a given issue 
area of international relations (Biermann et al. 2009, 15). To allevi-
ate policy clashes and lessen the “noodle bowl” effect of overlapping 
rules and regulations, this paper suggests that American and Asian 
governments should: (1) immediately pursue collaboration in the 
areas of investment and infrastructure; (2) advance investment co-
operation via capacity training and investment treaty consolidation; 
(3) enhance infrastructure collaboration via the Better Utilization of 
Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (or BUILD Act 
of 2018), joint ventures, public-private partnership, and capacity 
training; (4) push forward trade cooperation via formal and Track 
2 (informal networks) dialogue into a policymaking process; and (5) 
encourage more inter-bloc dialogue. 
This paper is organized as follows. The beginning section discusses 
a brief history of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. The economic ele-
ments of the policy are then unpacked, followed by the reception of 
the regional states to the strategy. Next, interplay between the agen-
das and policies of the United States and regional players concerning 
regional economic governance architectures is examined. The paper 
then provides policy recommendations for the United States and 
Indo-Pacific participants to enhance economic collaboration.
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At the 1993 APEC Ministerial 
Meeting in Seattle, participants 
pledged to contribute to an 
expanding world economy
Backdrop: Rivalry with China
The Indo-Pacific as an idea of strategic thinking is not new. It was coined 
by Gurpreet Khurana in his 2007 Strategic Analysis article “Security of 
Sea Lines: Prospects for India–Japan Cooperation.” In his piece, the 
term was used to refer to two strategic and political spaces encompassed 
by the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This conceptualization has long been 
familiar to those in the American policymaking circle. For instance, 
the U.S. Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific Command (previously 
named Pacific Command) has operated across two bodies of water as 
a single interconnected geostrategic plane. Also, the notions of “Free” 
and “Open” echo the spirit of APEC, of which the United States is a 
member. Illustratively, at the 1993 APEC Ministerial Meeting in Seattle, 
Washington, APEC participants pledged to continuously contribute to 
“an expanding world economy and [to support] an open international 
trading system…[and] reduce trade 
and investment barriers so that…
trade expands within the region 
and with the world and goods, ser-
vices, capital and investment flow 
freely among [regional] economies” 
(APEC 1993). Likewise, at the fol-
lowing year’s ministerial meeting in 
Bogor, Indonesia, these economies 
agreed to “adopt the long-term goal 
of free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific [which] will 
be pursued promptly by further reducing barriers to trade and invest-
ment and by promoting the free flow of goods, services and capital 
among [the] economies” (APEC 1994).
Furthermore, President Obama’s administration leaned on the 
Indo-Pacific concept to emphasize India as “a major pillar” of its Asia 
policy. Such recognition of New Delhi as one of the key regional 
players contributed to soaring U.S.-India ties under his presidency.1 
The upgrade of an annual strategic dialogue to a strategic and com-
mercial dialogue in 2015 as a platform to discuss bilateral relations at 
the highest political level was a case in point (Mistry 2016).
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Trump’s cabinet views the 
United States and China as 
being in in strategic competition 
in the Indo-Pacific region; if 
not well managed, it could 
jeopardize U.S. interests
While Washington has relied on the term “Indo-Pacific” to con-
ceptualize the region and formulate its foreign policies, the Trump 
administration’s use of the term has departed from previous eras. His 
administration is the first to use the term in a national document 
such as the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), and his Indo-
Pacific policy was crafted in light of a rising and revisionist China 
(Grossman 2018). The policy was formulated based on an assumption 
that China and the United States are locked in a power contestation. 
What motivates the Trump administration to coin and pursue 
the Indo-Pacific strategy amid the U.S.-China rivalry backdrop? 
The first motivation concerns 
the U.S.-China rivalry itself. 
President Trump’s cabinet views 
the United States and China as 
being in strategic competition 
in the Indo-Pacific region, and if 
the contestation is not well man-
aged, it could jeopardize U.S. 
interests.2 National documents 
cast Beijing as a revisionist power. 
For example, the 2018 National 
Defence Strategy (NDS) con-
tends that “China is leveraging military modernization, influence 
operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries 
to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage” (NDS 2018, 2). 
Likewise, the NSS conveys that “China seeks to displace the United 
States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven 
economic model, and reorder the region in its favor” (NSS 2017, 25). 
Moreover, Washington is specifically concerned with Beijing’s 
economic diplomacy, namely the latter’s policy combination of in-
ducements and coercion to shape foreign policy behaviors of par-
ticular regional stakeholders. As the NSS highlights, Beijing “is using 
economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and im-
plied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and 
security agenda. China’s infrastructure investments and trade strate-
gies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations.” This economic diplomacy 
partly accounted for Beijing’s ability to utilize its economic leverage 
to gain an upper hand in international relations, as seen in the South 
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The Trump administration 
perceives the Indo-Pacific as a 
zone where America’s economic 
future lies
China Sea case (NSS 2017, 46). Additionally, Chinese involvement 
in Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka has been reported to be 
driven more by geopolitical strategy than economics (Samaranayake 
2012). This concern was also reflected in Vice President Mike Pence’s 
remark at the 2018 APEC CEO Summit. While not directly ad-
dressing China and the China-led Belt Road Initiative (BRI), Pence 
stipulated that Washington’s approach to infrastructure development 
is “a better option. We don’t drown our partners in a sea of debt. We 
don’t coerce or compromise your independence. The United States 
deals openly, fairly. We do not offer a constricting belt or a one-way 
road” (Pence 2018). 
China’s rising ambition, as evinced by the BRI and Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), has raised anxiety in sev-
eral governments in the Indo-Pacific region. Announced by Chinese 
President Xi Jinping in 2013, BRI—comprising the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road and Silk Road Economic Belt—is aimed at aug-
menting China’s connectivity with other countries. At the time of this 
writing, the plan involves 65 countries, covers approximately $23 tril-
lion in combined GDP, and includes 4.4 billion people (Global Times 
2017). Launched in 2014, AIIB is 
a China-led multilateral develop-
ment bank purposed to provide 
financial support to infrastructure 
projects in Asia. The bank now 
has 87 members from around the 
world (AIIB 2018).
While China-led BRI and AIIB 
schemes have not yet led to en-
hanced Chinese power in the region, some countries are nevertheless 
worried that these initiatives possess great potential to enable Beijing 
to expand its sphere of influence and increase its maritime power 
projection.3 Such apprehension was mentioned in the NSS, which 
argues that “[s]tates throughout the region are calling for sustained 
U.S. leadership in a collective response that upholds a regional order 
respectful of sovereignty and independence” (NSS 2017, 46). In short, 
the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy was coined against this backdrop to 
assure American partners that Washington is here to work with them 
to foster a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” 
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Another motivation for the new Indo-Pacific strategy is America’s 
recognition of Asia as important to its economy. The Trump adminis-
tration perceives the Indo-Pacific as a zone where America’s economic 
future lies.4 Pointedly, it houses the world’s most dynamic economies 
and more than 50 percent of the earth’s population; obviously, this 
can be a very lucrative market for U.S. businesses. Around 60 percent 
of the global maritime commerce passes through Asia (UNCTAD 
2016). According to one analysis, “[t]he Indian Ocean and the Asia 
Pacific will be at the centre stage of the global container market” 
in the next two decades (Futurenautics 2013, 76). In the realm of 
energy, approximately 40 percent of the world’s liquefied natural gas 
trade occurs in the South China Sea (U.S. EIA 2017). 
Economic data has shown that the Asian region is significant to 
the U.S. economy. In 2017, the two-way trade between America and 
Asia stood around $1,544 billion (U.S. Census Bureau 2018a). As 
of July 2018, China, Japan, South Korea, and India were among the 
top 10 U.S. trading partners, constituting 15.4 percent, 5.1 percent, 
3 percent and 2.1 percent of America’s trade with the world (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2018b). In addition, U.S. investment in Asia has 
grown about 10 percent annually, rising from $227 billion in 2001 
to $605 billion in 2011 (East-West Center 2013). 
It should be highlighted that America’s adoption of the “Indo-
Pacific” term inevitably draws attention to the importance of India in 
the regional economy. A senior White House officer posited that such 
adoption was partially attributable to the administration’s recogni-
tion of India’s rise (Channel NewsAsia 2017). And it’s not a surprising 
move, given the soaring America-India economic ties in recent years. 
According to the East-West Center’s India Matters for America, bilat-
eral U.S.-India trade rose from $37 billion in 2007 to $109 billion in 
2015. Washington’s imports from New Delhi quadrupled from about 
$11 billion in 2000 to almost $45 billion in 2015 (East-West Center 
2017, 9). Additionally, U.S. investment in India increased almost 
200 percent over a decade, reaching approximately $28 billion in 
2015, while India’s foreign direct investment in America amounted 
to $9.2 billion in 2015, which is a rise of more than 500 percent 
since 2006 (East-West Center 2017, 12). Moreover, the state not 
only houses 1.3 billion people, but has 600 million individuals who 
are under 25 years old. Consequently, India’s huge market potential 
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and young workforce combined could make New Delhi one of the 
key economic players in the Indo-Pacific economy and beyond (Jack 
2018). Its economic potential notwithstanding, the country is not a 
party to APEC. While several experts called for the American backing 
of India’s APEC membership bid, Washington has not yet voiced ex-
plicit support for New Delhi’s entry into the bloc (Ayres 2017, Gupta 
2017).
Additionally, Asian governments have been deepening their 
economic integration via several schemes, including the ASEAN 
Economic Community Blueprint 2025 (AEC 2025), Comprehensive 
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), 
and Regional Comprehensive and Economic Partnership (RCEP). 
AEC 2025 is an integration project among 10 Southeast Asian econo-
mies aimed at achieving “a highly integrated and cohesive economy; 
a competitive, innovative, and dynamic ASEAN; enhanced con-
nectivity and sectoral cooperation; a resilient, inclusive, people-ori-
ented, and people-centred ASEAN; and a global ASEAN” (ASEAN 
Secretariat 2015). CPTPP is a free trade agreement (FTA) involv-
ing 11 Asia Pacific states with the purpose of liberalizing trade and 
investment in key areas such as technical barriers to trade, sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures, and state-owned enterprises. The nego-
tiation concluded in January 2018. Once CPTPP is enforced, this 
bloc will cover a market of 495 million people and have a combined 
GDP of CA$13.5 trillion (Government of Canada 2018). RCEP is 
an FTA under negotiation among 10 Southeast Asian countries and 
six of ASEAN’s dialogue partners. It is aimed at merging the existing 
ASEAN-Plus-One FTAs into a single contract. Talks are expected to 
be finished by the end of 2019 (The Japan Times 2018a). If concluded, 
this mega-trade deal will cover 46 percent of the global population 
and 24 percent of the world’s GDP (Jozuka 2017). Being more in-
tegrated economically, the significance of the Indo-Pacific region to 
U.S. businesses will heighten in years to come.
However, this area has several choke points that risk jeopardiz-
ing freedom of navigation, a principle that Washington holds dearly 
(Green and Shearer 2012). Consequently, the Indo-Pacific strategy 
was crafted to safeguard current and future U.S. commercial stakes 
in the region.5 Additionally, this policy was driven by Washington’s 
realization that it needs to convince its regional partners to beef up 
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their responsibilities in fostering regional stability. For example, this 
strategy regards India as a potential stabilizing actor on security and 
economic fronts. As some scholars claim, this shows that the Trump 
administration is conducting Jacksonian foreign policy, which re-
quires more burden-sharing by allies. In short, the Indo-Pacific strat-
egy calls for the players that the United States promises to defend to 
do their parts or meet their obligations (Clarke and Ricketts 2017; 
Hanson 2017). 
 
1. The Economic Components of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy
The U.S. envisions a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as “a region where 
sovereign and independent nations and diverse cultures can all pros-
per side-by-side, and thrive in freedom and in peace” (Douglas 2018). 
The policy hinges on two modifiers: “Free” and “Open.” Here, “free” 
means freedom from coercion by other players, entailing the concepts 
of sovereignty, rules-based order, and dispute settlement. “Open” refers 
to open commons (e.g., sea lanes, airways, cyberspace), open logistics 
(e.g., connectivity that drives regional growth and integration), open 
investment (e.g., investment environment fostering market econom-
ics), and open trade (e.g., free, fair, reciprocal trade). This strategy is 
also inclusive as Washington welcomes other like-minded countries to 
join forces in enhancing the Free and Open region.
Economics is seen as key to the Trump administration strategy, as it 
puts more emphasis on economic matters than other administrations.6 
This is evident in the NSS positing that “economic security is the U.S. 
national security” (NSS 2017, 17). In December 2017, President 
Trump stressed that “[e]conomic vitality, growth and prosperity at 
home is absolutely necessary for American power and influence abroad” 
(Trump 2017a). To delineate this point, the administration believes that 
economic gains allow a state to bolster its security. A strong and pros-
perous U.S. economy provides Washington with resources to augment 
its military capabilities and its ability to project power internationally. 
As a result, Washington will tailor its “approaches to different regions of 
the world to protect U.S. national interests” (NSS 2017, 45). The U.S. 
policy in the Indo-Pacific is no exception. Regarding the direction of 
regional U.S. economic engagement, the NSS suggests an overarching 
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theme of creating good regional economic governance. The text indi-
cates that Washington 
will encourage regional cooperation to maintain free and open 
seaways, transparent infrastructure financing practices, unimpeded 
commerce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes…pursue bilat-
eral trade agreements on a fair and reciprocal basis…seek equal and 
reliable access for American exports…work with partners to build 
a network of states dedicated to free markets and protected from 
forces that would subvert their [sovereignty and] strengthen coop-
eration with allies on high-quality infrastructure” (NSS 2017, 47).
More detailed policy directions can be teased out from Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Alex Wong’s press briefing in April 2018, which unveiled 
Washington’s plans to collaborate with regional participants in three 
economic areas: trade, investment, and infrastructure/connectivity. On 
trade, the administration aims at fostering “free, fair, and reciprocal” 
trade by lowering barriers.7 To America, the principles of “fairness” and 
“reciprocity” serve as a basis for open trade and the upholding of con-
tracts, and Washington wants to promote these principles to redress 
its trade deficit issue partially caused by tariffs and nontariff barriers 
of Asian nations.8 Moreover, Trump’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 
2017 Annual Report submitted to Congress in March 2018 further 
elaborates on how the administration would promote such “free, fair, 
and reciprocal” trade. The report stressed that the trade policy rests 
on five major pillars, with two of them having international aspects: 
negotiating better international deals, and reforming the multilateral 
trading system. 
Regarding the former, Washington has struck deals with other 
economies that are more favorable to its workers and businesses, e.g., 
improving existing FTAs, namely the United States-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement (formerly known as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA)) and the U.S.-Korea FTA (KORUS FTA). As 
for the parties to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—a mega-trade 
deal the United States withdrew from in January 2017—which do 
not have bilateral trade contracts with Washington, the administra-
tion “will continue efforts to build stronger, better, and fairer trad-
ing relationships with these countries” (USTR 2018, 12). Regarding 
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In the region, Washington 
wants to boost the investment 
climate, enhance private 
sector participation, and 
encourage entrepreneurship 
and innovation
multilateral trading system reform, the administration desires to make 
the system work better in ways that can more effectively safeguard 
American interests. The report also connotes America’s willingness to 
work with like-minded participants 
to build global trade systems that in-
crease the standard of living for both 
U.S. citizens and the world at large.  
On investment, Washington 
wants to boost the investment cli-
mate, enhance private sector partici-
pation, and ensure that investment 
in the region encourages entrepre-
neurship and innovation. Wong 
remarked that the United States is 
supporting “more open investment 
environments [and] more transparent regulatory structures…so that 
the region is not only open to more U.S. foreign direct investment, 
but that indigenous populations, indigenous innovators, [and] in-
digenous entrepreneurs can take advantage of the investment envi-
ronments to drive economic growth throughout the region” (Wong 
2018). To America, creating good rules facilitating investment be-
tween itself and regional economies will not only heighten trade 
and investment, but bolster prosperity for all involved, resulting in a 
win-win situation.9 As far as infrastructure/connectivity is concerned, 
the administration wants to promote good governance, especially in 
regards to the facilitation of high-quality infrastructure, best-value 
or cost-effective connectivity projects, and sustainable development 
(NSS 2017, 47). 
Additionally, the Trump administration wants to forge and 
strengthen partnerships with regional participants and institutions 
to identify, finance, and implement fiscally sound connectivity proj-
ects.10 This is unsurprising, as Washington is increasingly disturbed by 
China’s BRI and its state-driven model of infrastructure development, 
which is usually geared towards reaching the financier’s strategic aspi-
rations.11 To delineate this point, a 2017 U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission’s report raised concerns about China’s 
role in connectivity projects in mainland Southeast Asia, where the 
country has “capitalized on regional countries’ infrastructure needs” 
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The BUILD Act will heighten 
Washington’s connectivity assis-
tance in the Indo-Pacific region
(U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2017, 11). 
Beijing’s financial support has enabled it to get access to key strategic 
locations such as ports, thereby tipping the policy behavior of these 
ASEAN members in its favor. The report also questioned Beijing’s 
business model in terms of transparency, environmental impact, and 
its effect on the livelihood of local people, e.g., “Chinese dams on the 
Mekong River threaten the food security of 60 million people, cre-
ating significant stability risks” (U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission 2017, 11). Therefore, the United States plans to 
develop financing institutions and work with like-minded entities in 
order to promote a developmental model encouraging private sector 
involvement and economic growth, as well as bring tangible benefits 
to local societies.12 
America’s connectivity pursuit is reflected in Trump’s remarks at 
the 2017 APEC CEO Summit in Vietnam. The president pledged to 
support multilateral financing institutions, namely the “World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank[,] to direct their efforts toward high-
quality infrastructure investment that promotes economic growth[,]” 
and to reform the American “development finance institutions so that 
they better incentivize private sector investment in…[regional] econo-
mies, and provide strong alternatives to state-directed initiatives that 
come with many strings at-
tached” (Trump 2017b). 
Following his rhetoric, 
work is being undertaken. 
The bipartisan BUILD Act of 
2018, aimed at consolidating 
American development finan-
cial authorities, was introduced 
to Congress on March 1, 2018. The House and Senate passed the legis-
lation in September and October 2018 by a vote of 398–23 and 93–6, 
respectively. Trump signed the act into law on October 5, 2018. The 
BUILD Act will heighten Washington’s connectivity assistance in the 
Indo-Pacific region. First, it will undertake the reform of American 
development finance institutions by creating the U.S. International 
Development Finance Corporation (IDFC). This new entity will 
“assume the activities of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC), USAID’s Development Credit Authority, USAID’s Enterprise 
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Funds, and USAID’s Office of Private Capital and Microenterprise” 
(U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2018). Also, the bill 
grants IDFC “the ability to make equity investment, a doubling of the 
contingent liability ceiling to $60 billion, and an extended operating 
authority” (Ingram 2018). Besides this reform, Washington has been 
engaging other regional governments to jointly pursue infrastructure 
building in the Indo-Pacific. For example, America, Japan, India, and 
Australia are collectively examining ways to set up financing schemes to 
mend the connectivity gaps in the region (Reuters 2018a). In addition, 
U.S. and Japanese agencies signed a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) to provide high-quality energy infrastructure for emerging 
Indo-Pacific clients (JBIC 2017). 
2. Reception of Regional States to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy
Like the United States, other regional states have coined their own 
Indo-Pacific strategy. So far, the Trump administration’s vision of a 
“Free and Open Indo-Pacific” has been met with positive reactions 
from certain regional states, as they realize what President Trump 
has in mind. The Japanese version of its own “Free and Open Indo-
Pacific” strategy, which can be teased out from Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe’s speech “The Confluence of the Two Seas” to the Indian 
Parliament in 2007, emphasizes the importance of “maintaining and 
strengthening a free and open maritime order based on the rules of law 
in this region…and making the seas…a ‘global commons’ that brings 
stability and prosperity to all countries.”13 India, which has incorpo-
rated the Indo-Pacific concept since 2012 to showcase New Delhi as 
a regional power, envisions the region as free, open, rules-based, and 
inclusive (Government of India 2018). Furthermore, Australia’s 2017 
Foreign Policy White Paper depicts the country as “determined to realise 
a secure, open and prosperous Indo–Pacific” (Government of Australia 
2017). The U.S. policy also aligns with Australia’s interest in maintain-
ing the balance of power in the region, as outlined in the latter’s white 
paper. In addition, Indonesia’s concept of the Indo-Pacific collabora-
tion rests on the principles of openness, transparency, inclusiveness, 
and of upholding international law (Marsudi 2018). 
Several foreign actors were delighted to learn that the United 
States sees the importance of small- and medium-sized actors and 
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multilateral institutions shaping regional governance architectures.14 
Such a stance was reflected in the NSS document (NSS 2017, 46) and 
Secretary Wong’s remark that 
[considering] the strategic logic of an organization like ASEAN, it’s 
an opportunity for small[-] and medium-sized countries to band to-
gether, use their collective weight, [and to] work in consensus in order 
to balance larger powers in the region and throughout the world…
[Thus, the American] corollary policy…is to invest or continue to 
invest in ASEAN, continue to invest in APEC, to ensure that these 
regional organizations which convene the nations of the entire Indo-
Pacific are committed to the principles [Washington considers to 
create] strategic…[and] economic benefits” (Wong 2018).
Notably, this American policy situates Southeast Asia in the middle, 
or at the “heart” of, the Indo-Pacific region, paving the way for the 
latter’s elevated role in altering the future development of regional ar-
chitecture. It also alludes to Washington’s desire to leverage regional 
mechanisms to further deepen economic collaboration between itself 
and regional parties.
Nevertheless, many Asian policymakers cast doubt on exactly how 
the United States will implement its plans to advance economic co-
operation in the three areas—trade, investment, and infrastructure—
it has pledged.15 The question then becomes: What are the actual 
programs Washington wants to 
create and/or advance to help it 
accomplish such collaboration? 
The jury is still out on that. In 
addition, recent U.S. moves 
have left regional governments 
uncertain about the former’s 
seriousness about fostering a 
“Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” 
For instance, when launching a trade war with China, Trump has 
ignored the fact that Southeast Asian inputs are incorporated into the 
latter’s exports to the United States. And in April 2018, the adminis-
tration threatened to withdraw a special tariff treatment for Indonesia 
(Beo Da Costa 2018). Moreover, some regional states perceive that the 
Washington desires to leverage 
regional mechanisms to further 
deepen economic collaboration 
between itself and regional parties
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Washington’s plans to engage 
the region in the realm of con-
nectivity/infrastructure have 
met with positive feedback
U.S. vow to leverage regional platforms such as ASEAN and APEC to 
execute its Indo-Pacific strategy seem empty, as little concrete action 
has followed that pledge.16 To summarize, although more articulation 
is needed, the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy in its current form, with 
America’s continued engagement with regional players and multi-
lateral institutions, is to some degree 
reassuring to Indo-Pacific actors.17 As 
a result, this partly explains why this 
American policy has been welcomed by 
regional governments. 
It is worth noting that the degree of 
reception to the Trump strategy varies 
across economic areas. Washington’s 
plans to engage the region in the 
realm of connectivity/infrastructure have met with more positive 
feedback when compared to the strategy’s other two aspects. Several 
Indo-Pacific stakeholders applauded America’s agenda to supply in-
frastructure alternatives to the existing options to help fulfill their 
needs.18 According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (ADB 
2017), there exists a huge financing gap in developing Asia. The zone 
would need more than $1.7 trillion annually from 2016–2030 to 
meet connectivity/infrastructure needs, but multilateral develop-
ment banks were able to fund only 2.5 percent of that demand. This 
deficit partly contributed to the delayed implementation of regional 
connectivity programs. For example, the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline 
program, purposed to connect Southeast Asia’s gas exporters to con-
sumers, and the ASEAN Power Grid initiative, aimed at combining 
national energy markets into a regional market, were less than 50 
percent completed by 2015 (Pitakdumrongkit 2018a).
In addition, the U.S. plan syncs well with power balancing con-
cerns of some regional states.19 Craving for connectivity improvement 
notwithstanding, the Indo-Pacific stakeholders do not blindly scram-
ble for external support. Regional states increasingly realize the risk 
of a sovereignty trade-off, especially when they overwhelmingly rely 
on certain donors and financiers over others. Assistance, financial and 
otherwise, given by other actors often comes with “strings attached,” 
which may someday enable donors to gain leverage over recipients, 
altering international dynamics.20 Since the 99-year lease of Sri 
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Lanka’s Hambantota Port to China and the 414-kilometer Vientiane-
Kunming high-speed railway project between China and Laos were 
announced, sovereignty concerns heightened. Regarding the Sino-
Laos high-speed rail program, observers raised questions about the 
project’s commercial viability, Laos’ ability to pay back loans, and 
the issue of expropriated land (Hutt 2018). To elaborate, the scheme 
is worth US$6 billion, which is about half the state’s 2016 GDP of 
US$13.7 billion. It was also reported that Beijing reached a deal with 
Laos to take the latter’s land for 50 meters on each side of the track 
(Janviroj 2017). Such news not only makes Indo-Pacific nations 
wary of accepting economic development assistance from powerful 
foreign entities, it also fuels pushback against assistance and compels 
them to tread more cautiously. For instance, India has halted the 
progress of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) initia-
tive—originated in 1999—as it was roped under China’s BRI banner 
(Singh, Sinderpal 2018). In Cambodia, public outcry concerning 
the lack of transparency and environmental impact of BRI projects 
has recently intensified (Moss 2018). After Cambodian authorities 
approved a plan to build the largest airport in Southeast Asia—in 
Kandal Province—with support from the China Development Bank, 
Cambodia’s civil society reprimanded the program’s debt sustainabil-
ity (Kimsay and O’Byrne 2018).  
While some Indo-Pacific participants pushed back against their 
donors and external influence, others chose to diversify. For instance, 
Indonesia’s Jokowi administration, despite awarding China a Jakarta-
Bandung high-speed railway project in 2015, tried to navigate among 
big powers (Moss 2018). “Concerned about appearing to be in China’s 
pocket, senior government officials are looking to South Korean and 
Japanese investors to provide more balance.” The Indonesian officer in 
the article reportedly encouraged Japanese firms to bid for the state’s 
oil and gas blocks in 2017 (McBeth 2017). Moreover, at the time of 
this writing, the 350-kilometer Singapore-Kuala Lumpur high-speed 
train project is currently up for open bidding and it is expected there 
will be a face-off among European, Chinese, and Japanese companies 
for the contract award (Mazumdaru 2018). The urge for regional 
states to diversify partly explains why the U.S.-ASEAN Smart Cities 
Partnership launched at the U.S.-ASEAN Summit in November 
2018 was greeted with enthusiasm by ASEAN countries. The 
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initiative is aimed at augmenting Southeast Asian digital economies 
(Widakuswara 2018). Particular Indo-Pacific states are keen to see 
the United States provide additional infrastructure assistance, as this 
would widen their range of possible connectivity programs, allowing 
the states to undertake power balancing to serve their own interests. 
Nevertheless, certain regional stakeholders are skeptical about the 
extent to which America could implement its connectivity policy. As 
of 2016, U.S. corporations had $1.7 trillion in savings, $1.2 trillion 
of which was parked overseas (Platt 2016). While this money could 
be used to invest in connectivity projects in the Indo-Pacific, the 
American private sector has little appetite for such investment due 
to the region’s poor investment grade credit ratings and scarce avail-
ability of bankable projects (Bhattacharyay, Kawai, and Nag 2012). 
One study found that 55-65 percent of the connectivity projects in 
Asia are unbankable without support from governments or multilat-
eral financing institutions (Marsh & McLennan Companies 2017). 
Moreover, an American authority noted that infrastructure financing 
by U.S. firms in Asia has declined since the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997–1998, as American resources were diverted from the region to 
fulfill rising connectivity demands in the United States. Additionally, 
the U.S. business model renders its public officers less able to ef-
fectively rally the private sector to invest where they desire. This 
makes regional states question Washington’s ability to harness private 
finance to contribute to connectivity projects in the Indo-Pacific. 
Furthermore, many regional actors doubt U.S. ability to tailor con-
nectivity programs to fit the needs of a region so diverse, as different 
Indo-Pacific economies are at dissimilar stages of development.21 
In the area of investment, Asian nations welcomed the prin-
ciples laid out by the Trump administration, especially increased 
private sector investment, which encourage investment projects that 
can boost entrepreneurship and innovation due to the aligning of 
economic goals. Nevertheless, they are unsure of the U.S. policy 
measures themselves, as not much is known about the rules and 
regulations to be crafted to promote or uphold the above principles. 
Frequently discussed questions by Indo-Pacific policymakers include: 
Will Washington be willing to work together with several Asian 
actors to jointly develop rules to bolster good investment governance 
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architectures, or will the United States unilaterally create rules and 
impose them on other regional stakeholders? 22  
Additionally, Indo-Pacific stakeholders are worried about the 
implications of recent American actions on the future of U.S.-Asia 
investment flows. For instance, in August 2018, Trump signed into 
law the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 
(FIRRMA), which expands the 
authority of the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in 
the United States (CFIUS). 
CFIUS is an interagency com-
mittee mandated to review 
transactions that can lead to 
foreign acquisitions of American businesses to determine their effects 
on American national security. 
As a result, CFIUS has become more vigilant in preventing foreign 
acquisition of sensitive American technological innovation. This was 
reflected in a pilot program, which began on November 10, allowing 
the agency to review certain foreign investments in U.S. businesses in 
27 sectors including aviation, semiconductors, and telecommunica-
tions. This means that such investments enabling foreign investors to 
gain “access to non-public information or afford power to nominate 
a board member or make other substantial decisions” must be subject 
to review under CFIUS. CFIUS will determine whether it approves 
the transaction within 30 days or trigger a fuller investigation (Bartz 
2018). While this program shows CFIUS’ new power, some ques-
tions remain, such as whether the agency would be granted power 
to oversee additional types of transactions, including “investments 
where a foreign company would not necessarily gain control of a U.S. 
firm…[such as]…joint ventures between U.S. and foreign companies, 
minority stake investments and transactions near military bases or 
U.S. government facilities” (Lane 2018). Moreover, whether such 
review would be under the jurisdiction of CFIUS or the export regu-
lations of the Commerce Department is still up for debate (McQueen 
2018). This effort to reform CFIUS sparked angst among not only 
American but Indo-Pacific investors. It is often argued that FIRRMA 
was mainly driven by Washington’s desire to prevent Chinese take-
overs of American firms and access to the former’s technology (Cowan 
In investment, will Washington 
be willing to work together with 
several Asian actors?
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Some Indo-Pacific actors believe 
America’s current approach is a 
mercantilist, zero-sum framework 
in which balanced, bilateral trade 
is the goal
2018). Nevertheless, Indo-Pacific companies are aware that their own 
investments might not be completely off the hook. A case in point is 
CFIUS blocking the March 2018 takeover attempt by Singapore-based 
Broadcom of American chipmaker Qualcomm (Granville 2018).
FIRRMA expands the scope of the agency’s review to cover other 
industries such as real estate acquisitions near American military fa-
cilities (Hufbauer 2017). Additionally, one expert warned that the 
CFIUS reform could result in greater restrictions of U.S. outbound 
investment into the Indo-Pacific region. The reform could further 
undercut cross-border capital movements between American and 
regional economies.23
As far as trade is concerned, several Indo-Pacific participants don’t 
believe the Trump administration will foster trade collaboration. 
From their perspective, America’s current approach is a mercantilist, 
zero-sum framework in which balanced, bilateral trade is the primary 
goal. These regional stakeholders also doubt U.S. commitment in this 
area after Washington pulled 
out of TPP. This uncertainty, 
shared earlier by regional 
actors, changed to a feeling 
of disruption when Trump 
inked an MOU to impose 
25 and 10 percent tariffs on 
imported steel and alumin-
ium, respectively, in March 
2018, which potentially hurt 
not only these industries but 
other sectors using these commodities as inputs.24 This came just two 
months after the administration imposed tariffs on imports of solar 
panels and washing machines (Lynch 2018). At the time of this writ-
ing, these duties are still intact for most countries, including Canada 
and Mexico, the European Union (EU), and China (Dhue 2018). 
Tariff escalations and trade tensions resulted. For example, in April, 
China retaliated by slapping duties on the imports of 128 U.S. goods, 
ranging from pork to steel pipes (Buckley 2018). This was followed 
by a series of tariff increases by both sides, entangling them in a trade 
war (Martin and Bryan 2018; Mitchell et al. 2018; Xinhuanet 2018). 
However, the trade showdown was temporarily suspended when both 
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economies agreed on a 90-day truce at a sideline meeting at the G-20 
Summit in Argentina on December 1, in which they agreed to sort 
out ways to resolve their conflicts, 
including those involving tech-
nology transfer and intellectual 
property rights (BBC News 2018; 
Breuninger and David 2018).
Although some experts 
argued that a Sino-U.S. trade 
war may eventually be avoided 
due to the high cost for both sides,25 this logic has not effectively 
quelled the angst held by Indo-Pacific parties for several reasons. First, 
Indo-Pacific nations acknowledge a shift in U.S. sentiment towards 
China. The majority of American think tanks and politicians share a 
position that China’s noncompliance to international law warrants 
harsher American measures towards the latter. Capitol Hill’s silence 
following the Trump administration’s threat to slap tariffs on Chinese 
products is a case in point. No congressperson or senator came for-
ward to chastise such action.26 Another reason involves Trump’s cabi-
net reshuffle. Larry Kudlow replacing Gary Cohn in March 2018 as 
the chief economic advisor has weakened the globalization faction 
within his cabinet.27 
Also, stark differences between both sides await resolution. 
Washington demanded Beijing scrap its subsidies to industries 
under the “Made in China 2025” policy.28 This initiative is a stra-
tegic plan unveiled by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on May 2015, 
aimed at accomplishing Chinese competitiveness and prominence 
in 10 cutting-edge technological sectors such as aviation, robotics, 
and new energy vehicles. However, Chinese authorities insisted that 
“its industrial strategy was non-negotiable” (South China Morning 
Post 2018). Another event hinted that Beijing will not easily yield to 
Washington’s demand. At a gathering to celebrate the 40th anniversa-
ry of China’s Reform and Opening Up on December 18, President Xi 
Jinping voiced that “[n]o one is in a position to dictate to the Chinese 
people what should or should not be done” (Channel NewsAsia 2018). 
Moreover, the 90-day ceasefire between the United States and 
China may not put an end to their trade war. Even though Beijing 
will make concessions until March 2019, it may not be able to fulfill 
At the G-20 Summit, China and 
the U.S. entered into a 90-day 
truce in their brewing trade war
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the Trump administration’s desires. China’s purchase of a “very sub-
stantial” amount of agricultural, industrial, and energy goods from 
the United States is relatively easy, but the country might not be able 
to implement measures addressing its “unfair” trade practices to the 
extent that satisfies Washington within this 90-day timeframe, and 
hence a trade war may likely resume. As a result, Indo-Pacific stake-
holders will proceed with caution in the new year (BBC News 2018).
Such a trade showdown does not bode well for Indo-Pacific 
states. As their economies are intertwined in cross-border production 
networks, they foresee themselves suffering from collateral damage. 
The America-China confrontation can to some degree hurt the in-
termediate goods exports among regional economies. Depending on 
the product, the latter distributes parts and components to China, 
which then assemble and ship the final products to the U.S. market. 
For instance, the components of iPhones from Asian economies are 
shipped to Foxconn factories located in Shenzhen, Chengdu, and 
other Chinese cities for final assembly, before exporting to the world. 
American tariffs on various Chinese products in the trade war will 
discourage the sales of regional goods. This will lead to a reduction 
of intermediate goods exports from other regional states. Moreover, 
such tariff dueling will likely significantly erode the competitiveness 
of smaller and medium enterprises (SMEs) more than large corpora-
tions, as the former are less able to relocate their factories and shift 
supply chains from one country to another.29 SMEs are the backbone 
of several Asian economies. In the Indo-Pacific, they make up more 
than 90 percent of all businesses, contribute to one-third of the re-
gion’s total export value, and provide two out of three private sector 
jobs. 
As a result, the U.S.-Sino trade war will undermine regional state 
enterprises and economies (Yoshino and Taghizadeh-Hesary 2016). 
Some Indo-Pacific leaders have not been shy about voicing their 
concerns. Then-Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull re-
marked that nobody would win from a trade confrontation between 
the United States and China (SBS News 2018). Likewise, Singapore 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong maintained that “unilateral tariffs 
are not the correct solution. A trade war between the United States 
and China…if [it] breaks out…will gravely undermine the rules-
based multilateral system that has underpinned global prosperity 
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since the end of World War II. Countries around the world, big and 
small, will be hurt” (Loong 2018). 
Another source of Indo-Pacific agitation is the Trump adminis-
tration’s fixation on the goods trade deficit and focus on protecting 
U.S. intellectual property rights. This is reflected in the reports of 
the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). The 
entity released a study listing several regional states having a goods 
trade surplus with Washington.30 Also, USTR’s 2017 Notorious 
Markets List, published in January 2018, named several online and 
physical markets in China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Vietnam 
in which copyright infringement occurred. Moreover, the agency’s 
2018 Special 301 Report on Intellectual Property Rights released 
in April 2018 placed China, India, and Indonesia on the prior-
ity watch list, and Pakistan, Thailand, and Vietnam on the watch 
list. Such moves raised Asian policymakers’ anxiety about the pos-
sibility of Washington’s sanctions through tariffs or restrictions of 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits.31 Furthermore, as 
USTR launched Section 301 investigations on China and threatened 
to impose tariffs on the latter’s exports, regional stakeholders viewed 
that the Super 301 mechanism could be used against them in the 
future (Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, gives the 
USTR broad authority to respond to a foreign nation’s unfair trade 
practices.) Additionally, even though a U.S. State Department senior 
official assured that America’s Indo-Pacific strategy is not aimed at 
containing China (Nelson 2017), Washington’s recent harsh stance 
towards the latter tempted Asian policymakers to ponder if, in the 
future, they might be forced to choose between two great powers.32 
3. Interactions between U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and Regional 
State Agendas
Interplay between the agendas of America and Indo-Pacific countries 
concerning regional economic building differ across issue areas. An 
obvious clash occurs between U.S. and Asian policies regarding ways 
to construct regional trade architectures. For the former, trade will be 
advanced via bilateral deals. According to President Trump’s remarks 
at APEC’s 2017 CEO Summit, Washington “will make bilateral trade 
agreements with any Indo-Pacific nation that wants to be our partner 
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and that will abide by the principles of fair and reciprocal trade. What 
we will no longer do is enter into large agreements that tie our hands, 
surrender our sovereignty, and make meaningful enforcement practi-
cally impossible” (Trump 2017b). However, such insistence on bilater-
alism runs contrary to the trade regionalism approach of Asian states; 
these actors often favor multilateralism. This is partly because regional 
policymakers understand that bilateral trade negotiations usually set a 
big country (e.g., the United States) against a smaller one. This tends 
to increase the probability that big nations will pressure their smaller 
peers to agree on terms more favorable to the former. 
Indo-Pacific actors largely oppose Washington’s bilateral approach, 
partly accounting for why U.S. bilateralism has not received buy-ins 
from regional stakeholders. According to a Pew Research Center survey 
in June 2017, the majority of respondents in India, Indonesia, Japan, 
the Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam opposed Trump’s TPP with-
drawal with a median of 66 percent. Asian diplomats are also dismayed 
that America lacks plans to foster a TPP-like overarching regional ar-
chitecture covering not only multiple stakeholders, but other issues.33 
Some leaders were vocal about their disagreements towards America’s ap-
proach. For example, Japanese 
Deputy Prime Minister Taro 
Aso declined the possibility of 
Tokyo entering into bilateral 
trade talks with Washington 
(Kihara 2018). While other 
Indo-Pacific players chose not 
to explicitly express their posi-
tion, they nevertheless took a 
wait-and-see stance. Having watched NAFTA and KORUS renegotia-
tions unfold, these actors suspect they will be strong-armed into making 
concessions or accepting contract terms overwhelmingly favoring the 
United States. Therefore, they do not want to negotiate bilateral deals 
with America, as doing so could put their countries at a disadvantage.34
Against this backdrop, what will likely be the future concerning 
regional trade architectures? The divergence of ideas and approaches 
between Washington and Indo-Pacific parties will persist. If coop-
eration is unattainable, the latter will continue to pursue regional 
economic institutional building for a few reasons. First, Asia’s middle 
Indo-Pacific actors do not want 
to negotiate bilateral deals with 
America, as doing so could put 
their countries at a disadvantage
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class—defined as comprising households with per capita incomes 
between $10 and $100 per person per day in 2005, in terms of 
purchasing power—is growing (Kharas 2017; Ernst & Young 2013). 
According to Homi Kharas of the Brookings Institution (Kharas 
2017, 20), in 2022, Asians will emerge as the majority of individuals 
belonging to this income bracket. About 88 percent “of the next bil-
lion people in the middle class will be Asian.” Such a rise will heighten 
future regional economic demand and become the catalyst for Indo-
Pacific countries deepening their economic integration. A second factor 
is China. Chinese leaders recently reaffirmed their commitment to 
transform the state into a con-
sumption- and service-driven 
economy over the next 10 
years (GlobeNewswire 2018). 
Evidence points to regional 
economies being the main 
beneficiaries of this phenom-
enon. The region has witnessed 
a surge of Chinese tourists in 
several Asian destinations. In the past decade, the number of Chinese 
tourists in Southeast Asia quadrupled (The Economist 2018). India wit-
nessed a 15.6 percent increase in Chinese tourist arrivals from 2016–
2017 (Singh, Swaran 2018), while Beijing surpassed New Zealand as 
Australia’s biggest tourism market (Karaian 2018). In short, China’s 
economic transformation will generate greater demands for goods and 
services from other Asian economies for years to come. 
The efforts of governments in the Indo-Pacific to craft rules further 
deepening cross-border supply chains are reflected in CPTPP. This 
bloc is likely to expand because several economies, such as South 
Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Thailand expressed their enthusiasm 
for joining (The Japan Times 2018b). Other attempts at deepening 
cross-border supply chains include the ongoing negotiation of RCEP. 
While RCEP may not be as ambitious as TPP (Wan 2018), this mega-
trade deal’s quality can be improved in the future if members agree 
to add a consulting mechanism allowing RCEP to have a regula-
tory framework upgrade. In this way, the multilateral arrangement’s 
long-term values can be created. However, an involved mediator 
pointed to the fact that RCEP negotiation is a daunting task due to 
According to Homi Kharas, in 
2022, Asians will emerge as the 
majority of individuals belonging 
to the middle class
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divergent levels of economic development, absence of prior bilateral 
deals between certain players such as China and India, India and 
New Zealand, and Japan and South Korea, and different preferences 
among parties (Robeniol 2018). These challenges may result in a 
bargaining stalemate. Even if RCEP talks collapse, trade regionalism 
is not entirely doomed. Rather, regional economies are still left with 
their existing trade treaties, namely ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA), 
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP), 
ASEAN-Korea FTA (AKFTA), ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA 
(AANZFTA), and ASEAN-India FTA (AIFTA). In the future, terms 
of these treaties can be improved to create better rules that enhance 
trade among members.
Unlike trade, Washington and Indo-Pacific national agendas con-
cerning regional investment governance are not in direct contrast. 
However, with little coordination between them, their approaches 
could ultimately worsen the “investment noodle bowl” issue. To de-
lineate this point, the United States and regional states usually make 
investment rules through bilateral international investment agree-
ments (IIAs) and other contracts with investment provisions. As of 
May 10, 2018, America concluded 48 bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs), but only two with Indo-Pacific actors—Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka. The United States also concluded bilateral trade deals that 
contained investment provisions with regional state economies South 
Korea (KORUS) and Laos (U.S.-Laos Trade Relations Agreement) 
(U.S. Department of State 2018a, 2018b; UNCTAD 2018).
Likewise, the common approach for Indo-Pacific players to bol-
ster cross-border financial flows likens Washington’s to a great degree. 
Illustratively, to date, they have concluded more than 1,000 BITs. 
Worldwide, about one-third of BITs have at least one Asian member 
as a contracting party. Moreover, these IIAs entail a relationship be-
tween regional and extra-regional parties. Indo-Pacific players tended 
to sign onto IIAs with their capital-intensive, capital-exporting part-
ners, namely American and Western European economies (Chaisse and 
Hamanaka 2014). 
While each regional investment initiative faces certain limitations 
lessening their ability to boost investment among U.S. and Indo-
Pacific economies, a few exceptions to this trend deserve mentioning. 
First, we’ll view the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
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(ACIA), signed by regional economic ministers in February 2009. 
ACIA merged two existing arrangements—the 1998 ASEAN invest-
ment area and the 1987 ASEAN investment guarantee agreement—
to govern foreign direct investment into Southeast Asia under a single 
contract. Nevertheless, this framework targets only ASEAN and 
foreign ASEAN-based investors and investment institutions, mean-
ing that foreign investors and institutions which are not based in 
Southeast Asia cannot benefit from the scheme. Another investment 
governance framework to look at is the RCEP FTA; this partnership’s 
investment chapter can help foster transnational investment among 
its 16 members. However, these members constitute only a subset 
of countries in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, the deal is still under 
negotiation and has faced several challenges, namely different levels 
of ambition among the negotiating parties and an absence of clear 
leadership, which could hurt the prospect of it coming to fruition by 
the end of 2019 as expected (Pitakdumrongkit 2018b).
In addition, TPP originally contained an investment chapter 
that could have augmented regional investment among the United 
States and its Indo-Pacific partners, such as Australia, Brunei, Japan, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore. However, when Washington 
walked away in 2017, the 
pact resurrected as CPTPP, 
but this survived version sus-
pended particular investment 
provisions, namely the inves-
tor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) clause. In cases which 
host governments breach a 
contract, the ISDS mecha-
nism permits private entities to sue the former and bypass domestic 
courts, allowing them to take disputed cases to international arbitra-
tion tribunals. Without this provision, international investors may 
not feel that their investment is adequately protected. Consequently, 
because CPTPP lacks an ISDS, these investors may refrain from 
moving their capital to the Indo-Pacific area. In summation, while 
their approach to investment rule-making does not run in opposite 
directions, Washington and Indo-Pacific parties tend to commit 
“benign neglect” by paying little attention to the problem of IIA 
Washington and Indo-Pacific par-
ties tend to commit 'benign neglect' 
by paying little attention to the 
problem of IIA proliferation
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proliferation. While some regional investment governance arrange-
ments attempt to address the issue, these arrangements face their own 
challenges as mentioned above. As the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)’s World Investment Report 
2011 precisely conveys, “[w]ith thousands of treaties, many on-going 
negotiations and multiple dispute-settlement mechanisms, today’s 
IIA regime has come close to a point where it is too big and complex 
to handle for governments and investors alike” (UNCTAD 2011). 
A central question then becomes: What would the future of regional 
investment governance architectures look like? One potential scenario 
is a fragmented investment governance system fueled by many IIAs 
and the persisting mutual ignorance by America and Indo-Pacific par-
ties. This would have grave implications on the future of investment 
and trade characterized by cross-border supply chains. IIA proliferation 
begets a consistency problem, as different treaties may contain diver-
gent rules, regulations, and legal interpretations which can, in the end, 
discourage investors from investing in multiple economies; this will 
undermine commerce among U.S. and regional economies. In other 
words, in order to facilitate transnational value chains, capital must 
first be allocated to establish and operate production facilities in sev-
eral locations around the world. Hence, if these financial movements 
are hindered or disrupted by the “noodle bowl” issue, trade between 
America and its Indo-Pacific partners will be suppressed.
As far as connectivity/infrastructure governance is concerned, the 
interplay between U.S. and Indo-Pacific actors resembles that of the 
investment area. The region’s infrastructure governance can be char-
acterized by an alphabet soup of various connectivity schemes. Rules 
have been shaped by different donors, financiers, and frameworks 
with little coordination among them, making infrastructure invest-
ment more competitive than cooperative.35 This leads to a gover-
nance problem. To delineate this point, conflicts may arise when the 
players involved attempt to link different connectivity projects (e.g., 
roads, railways) supported by dissimilar governance programs. These 
circumstances bring up a pressing issue: Which rules or standards 
(e.g., rail gauge width) are to be adopted? Although evidence indi-
cates cooperation among different institutions, such as the cofinanc-
ing effort by the AIIB and ADB in projects in Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Georgia, and India (Reuters 2018b), it is uncertain whether they will 
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collaborate in the future. Different institutions usually have divergent 
visions, priorities, and practices concerning lending conditions, pro-
curement procedures, and labor and environmental standards. Such 
dissimilarities can instigate conflicts in subsequent interactions. Also, 
less is known about how other entities would undertake cooperation. 
According to one public authority, while some regional players set up 
a discussion platform to boost coordination amongst themselves, no 
financial resources are allocated to fund concrete programs to materi-
alize such collaboration.36 
Besides uncoordinated physical infrastructure development, the 
region is tainted with an institutional connectivity problem. In fact, 
the development of “institutional infrastructure,” namely, rules and 
regulations facilitating the flow of goods and services, often lags 
behind physical infrastructure building in several areas. This is mainly 
due to the fact that little effort has been put forth by regional actors 
to collectively make rules enhancing the facilitation of international 
logistics. This, hence, begets nonsynchronized regulatory frameworks 
hindering transnational goods and services transport. One study 
tracking the progress of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS)—a 
subregional cooperative program among China’s Yunnan Province, 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam—revealed that 
while physical routes were completed, regulatory and administrative 
support was inadequate. This 
lack of support eventually 
became a barrier to the transit 
of goods and services. To il-
lustrate, half of the time used 
to ship goods from Da Nang, 
Vietnam, to Tak Province, 
Thailand, was spent at cus-
toms and border crossings. 
“From a cost perspective, 42.6 [percent] of the door-to-door transport 
costs are collected at customs and border crossings. The amount is 
almost equivalent to the cost of physical transportation” (Banomyong 
2010, 36). In addition, institutional logistical linkages between East 
and Southeast Asia are mostly absent. Take Myanmar, which is usu-
ally regarded as a country of land bridges between these two zones. 
According to a joint study by ADB and the Asian Development Bank 
It’s clear that nonalignment of 
rules and regulations hinder the 
transnational movement of goods 
and services
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Institute (ADBI), there are no transit agreements between Myanmar 
and Thailand or Myanmar and India (ADBI 2015). Therefore, the 
future of regional connectivity governance architectures will likely 
be a fragmented one. There has been little coordination between dif-
ferent infrastructure providers and financial institutions. It is clear 
that nonalignment of rules and regulations hinder the transnational 
movement of goods and services.  
4. Policy Recommendations
Notwithstanding the differences in approach to the development of 
regional economic governance architectures by Washington and Indo-
Pacific nations, it is misguided to anticipate that economic regional-
ism will close off the United States to the area. Such a circumstance 
is highly unlikely, as regional economic architectures, namely ASEAN 
and APEC, have been built upon the principle of “open regionalism” 
(Bergsten 1997). Open regionalism is an outward-looking and liberal 
modality to regional economic integration in a sense that it embraces 
external parties in order to expand the networks of collaboration 
(Ravenhill 2000). For instance, the AEC 2025 posits that ASEAN shall 
[d]evelop a more strategic and coherent approach towards external 
economic relations with a view to adopting a common position in 
regional and global economic fora…continue to review and im-
prove ASEAN FTAs and CEPs to ensure that they remain modern, 
comprehensive, of high-quality and more responsive to the needs 
of businesses operating the production networks in ASEAN…
[and]…enhance economic partnerships with non-FTA Dialogue 
Partners by upgrading and strengthening trade and investment 
work programmes/plans (ASEAN Secretariat 2015, 36).
Likewise, open regionalism is in the APEC spirit as seen in its offi-
cial documents. For example, the 2001 APEC Leaders’ Declaration 
refers to this bloc’s unique modality, which is “based on the funda-
mental principles of voluntarism, consensus-building, combination of 
individual and collective actions, flexibility, comprehensiveness, and 
open regionalism, which has inspired and underpinned our successes” 
(APEC 2001). Thus, the door is still open for U.S. and Indo-Pacific 
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players to foster—together—economic cooperation. The following are 
steps these policymakers can take to help them jointly advance regional 
economic governance architectures. 
4.1. Immediately Pursue Collaboration in the Areas of 
Investment and Infrastructure/Connectivity
Given a clash in approaches concerning how to advance trade region-
alism between Washington and Indo-Pacific participants, resources 
should first be invested in the deepening of international collaboration 
in the realms of investment and infrastructure/connectivity. At the time 
of this writing, the United States is taking a step in the right direction.
4.2. Advance Investment Cooperation via Capacity Training 
Programs and Investment Treaty Consolidation 
The United States has great expertise in developing governance archi-
tecture of investment promotion, property registration, and contract 
enforcement. This has largely contributed to the nation’s transparent 
and sophisticated financial system and worldwide recognition of the 
dollar as the international currency. Many economies resort to the 
greenback to settle transactions among themselves. Some countries 
have even undergone complete or partial dollarization by adopting 
the dollar for their domestic use. However, many regional players fare 
less well than America in terms of technical knowledge. Consequently, 
some have struggled to make good investment rules, and this partially 
accounts for their less developed financial systems. Hence, with its 
greater expertise, the United States can take the lead in sharing its 
knowledge, experiences, and best practices in the form of capacity 
training programs. Doing so will enrich Indo-Pacific stakeholder rule-
making skills, enabling them to not only improve their own domestic 
financial systems, but advance regional mechanisms to better facilitate 
investment between American and regional economies; this knowl-
edge can also be used or applied by regional stakeholders to enhance 
their regional frameworks. For example, ASEAN, China, Japan, and 
South Korea launched the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI) in 
December 2002 under the ASEAN-Plus-Three financial cooperation 
process. ABMI is aimed at developing local currency-denominated 
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bond markets in order to better utilize regional savings and raise invest-
ment in Asia. However, the scheme’s progress has been modest recently, 
partly due to members lacking expertise and experience in developing 
bond markets. Although ABMI is limited to ASEAN-Plus-Three mem-
bers, in the future, this model of regional capital market building can 
be replicated in other parts of the Indo-Pacific if other actors have the 
know-how. In summary, Washington can leverage its financial adept-
ness to help provide capacity training for Indo-Pacific policymakers so 
that the latter can better implement investment rules and regulations at 
the national and regional levels, which in turn will increase investment 
among both regional and U.S. economies.
In cases where U.S. and regional participants want to make new in-
vestment treaties, joint effort should be made in helping address the frag-
mented Indo-Pacific investment governance system. There exists several 
ways to alleviate the IIA proliferation problem. For instance, UNCTAD’s 
World Investment Report 2017 outlines several solutions, such as treaty 
termination and suspension, in order to consolidate or manage different 
IIAs (UNCTAD 2017). Treaty termination can be achieved in different 
ways, such as aborting preexisting deals so that investment relationships 
are governed by a single contract. Article 21.7 of the Central America-
Mexico FTA that abolished the Mexico-Nicaragua FTA is one example. 
Alternatively, the involved participants can suspend certain investment 
arrangements while keeping other agreements in force. The deactivation 
of the Switzerland–South Korea BIT (1971), when the Switzerland-
Liechtenstein-Iceland-South Korea investment treaty (2005) took effect, 
is a case in point. When these options are not feasible, Washington and 
Indo-Pacific parties should work toward rule harmonization or the inter-
operationality of different investment regulations. Doing so can also help 
facilitate the movement of funds across borders.   
4.3. Enhance Infrastructure/Connectivity Collaboration via 
BUILD Act, Joint Ventures, Public-Private Partnership, and 
Capacity Training
The United States should immediately implement the BUILD Act, as it 
will enhance the country’s ability to more effectively roll out infrastruc-
ture finance instruments, hence elevating its role as a key player in Indo-
Pacific connectivity development. Besides traditional connectivity 
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construction, Washington and like-minded countries should stress 
the joint pursuit of e-infrastructure building due to rising regional 
demands. According to the World Bank, the 2016 Internet penetra-
tion rate in South Asia, and East Asia and Pacific was about 26 and 
46 percent, respectively (World Bank 2016). Although ASEAN has 
the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) purposed to close devel-
opment gaps among ASEAN parties, 
this scheme is limited to assist only 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and 
Vietnam (CLMV). As a result, the 
sockets in non-CLMV countries 
in need of e-connectivity cannot 
utilize IAI to fill their digital infra-
structure gaps.
Contrary to criticism that the 
U.S. private sector’s presence in the 
Indo-Pacific has diminished, America has been a key player in digital 
infrastructure construction. Its private conglomerates are at the fore-
front in this field. As Shambaugh (2018, 113) demonstrated, compa-
nies such as Amazon, Apple, eBay, Google, Oracle, Twitter, and Uber 
have actively supplied digital services and information technologies to 
their Indo-Pacific clients. The Trump administration is now unveiling 
initiatives to further tap into the technical capacities of these businesses. 
For instance, Secretary Pompeo announced in July 2018 that an ini-
tial $25 million investment would finance the Digital Connectivity 
and Cybersecurity Partnership aimed at augmenting regional state 
digital infrastructure through several means, including public-private 
partnership, to “catalyze American businesses to do what they do best” 
(Pompeo 2018). Additionally, via the Infrastructure Transaction and 
Assistance Network, the government will coordinate the involved 
agencies to assess projects, mobilize development finance, and supply 
technical assistance to Indo-Pacific nations.
Although these programs are laudable, the jury is still out on how 
they will be implemented to rally the U.S. private sector and boost 
their role in shaping Indo-Pacific digital connectivity. Therefore, it is 
suggested that U.S. authorities devise plans to coordinate among their 
related agencies, identify bankable projects, facilitate joint ventures 
To enhance its role in regional 
infrastructure and finance 
development, the United States 
should immediately implement 
the BUILD Act
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between American and other state companies, and foster a more fea-
sible environment for public-private partnership.
In addition to physical infrastructure building, American authori-
ties and other entities can deliver capacity training to Indo-Pacific poli-
cymakers, enabling them to develop rules and regulations facilitating 
transnational logistics. For instance, the ADBI regularly trains Asian 
officials on how to develop economic corridors (ADBI 2018). Also, 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has played 
a significant role in training Southeast Asian authorities to devise rules 
and regulations pertaining to trade facilitation, which ultimately led to 
a successful launch of the ASEAN Single Window (ASW) initiative in 
2005. ASW is aimed at linking the national windows of all 10 ASEAN 
members to allow electronic data submission for cargo clearance, re-
ducing the cost of doing business across these economies. Such train-
ing programs should be conducted with other Indo-Pacific countries 
to enable them to set up single windows in their respective subregions. 
Moreover, the capacity-building schemes should aim at tackling the 
fragmented connectivity governance marked by an alphabet soup of 
various frameworks. This can be done by organizing workshops on 
how to harmonize rules or boost the inter-operationality of different 
rules and regulations. 
4.4. Push Forward Trade Cooperation via Formal and Informal 
Dialogue, with the Incorporation of Track 2 Networks into the 
Policymaking Process
Because Washington insists on fostering “free, fair, and reciprocal” 
trade, and “fair” is largely defined by a trade balance term, there 
exists little room for Asian participants, namely those running a trade 
surplus with America, to negotiate trade deals satisfying all involved. 
As mentioned, the U.S. and Indo-Pacific approach to trade regional-
ism is likely to continue to diverge. The former opts for bilateralism 
while the latter prefers multilateralism. Moreover, the prospect of the 
United States joining CPTPP is slim. According to one American 
government official, the tide is turning against this deal. The U.S. 
Congress censured several aspects of TPP/CPTPP, namely labor 
standards and safeguards and environmental protection, arguing that 
these elements could place American businesses at a disadvantage. 
33The Impact of the Trump Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
Capitol Hill also demanded these components be adequately resolved 
before the U.S. rejoins the pact.37
Against this backdrop, a pressing question is: How can America and 
regional states together foster regional trade governance architectures? 
Although these stakeholders may not be able to negotiate and conclude 
trade deals in the short term, they should maintain regular formal and 
informal dialogue on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Such commu-
nication is necessary because it not only helps the participants identify 
ways to advance trade collaboration, but also lessens the chance of 
misperceiving or misinterpreting one another’s policies. With misper-
ceptions and misinterpretations, economic tensions can escalate into a 
full-blown trade war, deteriorating U.S.-Asia commerce.
Multilateral discussions can be held at regional platforms, especial-
ly ASEAN and APEC forums, for the following reasons. First, these 
schemes aim at facilitating economic growth, trade, and investment 
cooperation in the region. ASEAN members are deepening regional 
economic integration by implementing policy measures outlined in 
the AEC 2025. The blueprint calls for: “(i) A Highly Integrated and 
Cohesive Economy; (ii) A Competitive, Innovative, and Dynamic 
ASEAN; (iii) Enhanced Connectivity and Sectoral Cooperation; (iv) 
A Resilient, Inclusive, People-Oriented, and People-Centred ASEAN; 
and (v) A Global ASEAN” (ASEAN Secretariat 2015, 1). 
Likewise, APEC is purposed “to create greater prosperity for the 
people of the region by promoting balanced, inclusive, sustainable, 
innovative, and secure growth and by accelerating regional economic 
integration” (APEC 2018). Additionally, these forums embrace Track 
2 networking—informal talks—as part of their decision-making. 
Illustratively, the “ASEAN Way”—a set of principles upheld by 
ASEAN members such as informal consultation—has been used to 
lessen international conflicts or collectively devise feasible solutions 
to address regional problems. APEC’s discussions are often carried out 
in an open, nonbinding format which requires no treaty obligations. 
Such informality creates an atmosphere allowing those involved to 
be open and frank in exchanging concerns and test particular policy 
ideas before taking formal steps such as treaty formations. Contrary 
to criticism that these groupings are merely “talk shops,” ASEAN and 
APEC act as incubators of ideas which later materialize as practical 
policies to advance economic architectures. The agreement on trade 
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facilitation (often dubbed the “Bali Package”) endorsed by the Ninth 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali, Indonesia, in 2013, is a case in 
point. The arrangement, which took effect on February 22, 2017, is 
aimed at “expediting the movement, release and clearance of goods, 
including goods in transit” in the region (WTO 2018). The agree-
ment’s origin can be traced back to APEC. The bloc’s parties cham-
pioned the idea of a trade facilitation pact and played a significant 
role in making it adoptable at the World Trade Organization level. 
In short, Washington and Indo-Pacific stakeholders can leverage the 
informality of these venues to foster open discussions and explore 
new or innovative means to push forward trade regionalism. 
Besides intergovernmental organizations, Washington and regional 
states can leverage the expertise of think tanks and incorporate inputs 
from these Track 2 mechanisms into their policymaking process as 
well. American and Indo-Pacific 
officials should encourage an ex-
pansion of existing think tank net-
works such as the Network of East 
Asian Think-Tanks (NEAT) under 
the ASEAN-Plus-Three struc-
ture, and the Asian Think Tanks 
Network (ATTN) supported by 
ADB. NEAT was established in 
2003 as a Track 2 unit provid-
ing policy inputs to the ASEAN-Plus-Three cooperation process. 
Founded in 2013, the main objective of ATTN is boosting “system-
atic knowledge sharing among member think tanks, specifically on 
development experiences and policy lessons…[and augmenting] the 
think tank’s capacity to generate knowledge or provide policy advice 
on its domain” (ATTN 2018). The membership of both groups can 
be enlarged to include think tanks from America and other countries. 
Utilizing Track 2 networking is crucial, as it helps explore certain issues 
too sensitive to be discussed at intergovernmental or Track 1 (official 
government-to-government) platforms. Therefore, discourse among 
think tanks can enable countries to jointly examine economic issues and 
craft innovative solutions to problems. These recommendations can be 
forwarded to public officers to assist the latter’s policy formulation.
Informal talks: Track 2 
networking helps explore 
certain issues too sensitive to be 
discussed at intergovernmental 
or Track 1 platforms
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4.5. Foster Inter-Institutional Cooperation: Inter-Bloc 
Dialogue Encouragement
One effective way to advance Indo-Pacific economic cooperation is 
creating an overarching governance architecture which not only en-
compasses all Indo-Pacific stakeholders, but also covers collaboration 
in several economic aspects. This framework can act as a venue for 
the economies involved to discuss economic matters and challenges, 
and collectively devise policy actions to tackle such issues. For example, 
American and Indo-Pacific authorities can utilize this platform to adopt 
certain policy stances and approaches more compatible with each other. 
However, creating such a comprehensive umbrella organization may 
not be feasible at present, as doing so would require substantive re-
source allocation. 
While on July 18, Secretary Pompeo announced that America 
will support regional institutions such as ASEAN, APEC, and IORA, 
there has been no concrete action made by this administration to 
encourage dialogue among existing regional bodies. Thus, this 
paper suggests the United States and regional governments consider 
strengthening inter-institutional ties by initiating dialogue among 
different cooperative blocs. For example, conversations should be 
promoted among the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral 
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), IORA, ASEAN, 
and APEC, as these entities have several Indo-Pacific nations as mem-
bers and focus on bolstering international economic collaboration. 
Formed in June 1997, the main goal of BIMSTEC is “to harness 
shared and accelerated growth through mutual cooperation” via 
sector-driven collaboration such as trade and investment, transport 
and communication, energy, and tourism (BIMSTEC 2018). Its cur-
rent members are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri 
Lanka, and Thailand. IORA was created in March 1997 as an inter-
governmental organization with a focus on strengthening “economic 
dialogue and regional cooperation to promote sustainable growth 
and balanced development for a prosperous Indian Ocean Rim.” The 
entity features 21 members, including Australia, Bangladesh, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. America is 
also among its dialogue partners (IORA 2018). 
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Such inter-institutional communications are crucial as they 
increase the likelihood that these parties identify specific areas for 
cooperation. Doing so can lead to venues in which regional states 
can voice their concerns and exchange views on regional economic 
governance. Moreover, increased interactions through inter-bloc dia-
logue could breed trust among these stakeholders, paving a way for 
the future creation of an Indo-Pacific-wide economic grouping.
Conclusion
This study has discussed the impact of the Trump administration’s 
Indo-Pacific strategy on regional economic governance. The text has 
shown that this strategy’s economic components cover three areas: 
trade, investment, and infrastructure development. While the strategy’s 
trade elements are likely to clash with policies promoted by regional 
states, U.S. and regional government approaches to investment and 
infrastructure are not diametrically opposed. However, both American 
and Indo-Pacific nations have largely ignored the issue of fragmented 
governance systems in investment and infrastructure realms, which, 
with overlapping rules and regulations, can worsen the situation and 
hamper the ease of doing cross-border business. The paper has also 
provided policy recommendations to enhance collaboration among the 
United States and Indo-Pacific countries in these three areas. 
At the time of this writing, the Trump administration is rolling out 
programs as outlined by Secretary Pompeo in July 2018. These will 
be among the first batch of initiatives to test the impact of the U.S. 
Indo-Pacific strategy on regional economic governance. Interested 
scholars should assess the effectiveness of these schemes after their 
implementation and view how they interact with other initiatives 
advanced by other states and international organizations. Doing so 
can help us arrive at a more comprehensive picture of the effects of 
America’s Indo-Pacific strategy on regional economic governance. 
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